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Chapter 3
Platform Boot Integrity: 
Foundation for Trusted 
Compute Pools
In Chapter 2, we introduced the concept of trusted clouds and the key usage models to enable 
a trusted infrastructure. We provided a brief exposition of the boot integrity usage model, and 
its applicability across the three infrastructure domains—compute, storage, and network. In 
this chapter we will take a deeper look into ensuring the boot integrity of a compute platform, 
which boils down to ensuring the integrity of a number of platform components: the pre-
launch and launch components covering firmware, BIOS, and hypervisor. Boot integrity is 
foundational in embodying the concept of a trusted infrastructure.
This chapter provides an introduction to the concept of roots of trust in a trusted 
computing platform, the measured boot process, and the attestation that are critical 
steps for ensuring boot integrity. It also provides an overview of Intel’s Trusted Executed 
Technology (TXT), an example of root of trust technology for asserting platform boot 
integrity. Complementary to this is the concept of trusted compute pools, which is a 
logical or physical grouping of computing platforms with demonstrated platform boot 
integrity. Trusted compute pools embody the integrity of the virtual infrastructure, which 
can then enable granular controls, an essential requirement for virtualized data centers. 
Here, also, we present a solution reference architecture for building a trusted compute 
pool in a virtualized data center, and provide a case study of its implementation at the 
Taiwan Stock Exchange, with a number of typical use cases and the solution components 
of a successful implementation of trusted compute pools.
The Building blocks for Trusted Clouds
Organizations using or planning to use cloud services are starting to require that cloud 
service providers offer improved security at the hardware layer and greater transparency 
of system activities within and below the hypervisor. This means that cloud providers 
should be able to:
Give organizations greater visibility into the security states of the •	
hardware platforms running the IaaS for their private clouds.
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Produce automated and standardized reports on the •	
configuration of the physical and virtual infrastructure hosting the 
customers’ virtual machines and data.
Set policy concerning the physical location of the servers on •	
which the virtual machines are running, and control of the 
placement and migration of these virtual machines to acceptable 
locations based on such policy specifications (as some FISMA 
and DPA requirements dictate).
Provide measured evidence that their services infrastructure •	
complies with security policies and meets regulated data standards.
What is needed is a set of building blocks for the development of “trustworthy 
clouds.” These building blocks consist of:
A chain of trust rooted in hardware that extends to the hypervisor.•	
A hardening of the virtualization environment using known best •	
methods.
Provision of visibility for compliance and audit purposes.•	
Trust as an integral part of policy management for cloud activity.•	
A leveraging of infrastructure and services to address data •	
protection requirements.
Automation to bring it all together and achieve economies of •	
scale and management efficiency.
Cloud providers and other members of the IT community are carrying out research 
and development to address this need. A growing ecosystem of technology companies  
is collaborating to develop a new, interoperable trusted computing infrastructure. The 
goal is to reduce the risk of attack, such as come from virtual rootkits, by building a 
hardware-based root of trust founded on the assumption that a hardware-based,  
bottom-up approach can make this infrastructure more impervious to exploits than does 
today's mostly software-based approach.
Platform Boot Integrity
As described in the previous chapter, a trusted computing platform is said to have 
platform boot integrity—or boot integrity, for short—if the key controlling components 
(namely firmware, BIOS, and hypervisors) have demonstrated integrity. Two steps are 
needed to assert the integrity of the pre-launch and launch components:
 1. A measured boot process.
 2. Assurance and enforcement of the executed components 
as trusted components. This process is called attestation; 
without this, there is no assurance that the platform is in a 
trusted state.
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Before we describe these two steps, we have to look at roots of trust on a platform, as 
this is fundamental to a trusted computing platform.
Roots of Trust–RTM, RTR, and RTS in the Intel  
TXT Platform
Hardware-based roots of trust, when coupled with an enabled operating system, 
hypervisor, and solutions, lay the foundation for a more secure computing platform. This 
secure platform ensures hypervisor and VMM integrity at boot from rootkits and other 
low-level attacks. It establishes the trustworthiness of the server and the host platforms.
There are three roots of trust in a trusted platform:
Root of trust for measurement (RTM)•	
Root of trust for reporting (RTR)•	
Root of trust for storage (RTS)•	
RTM, RTR, and RTS are the system elements that must be trusted, because 
misbehavior in these normally would not be detectable in the higher layers. In an Intel 
TXT-enabled platform, the RTM is the Intel microcode, the Core-RTM (CRTM). An RTM 
is the first component to send integrity-relevant information (measurements) to the RTS. 
Trust in this component, thus, is the basis for trust in all the other measurements. The 
RTS contains the component identities (measurements) and other sensitive information. 
A trusted platform module (TPM) provides the RTS and RTR capabilities in a trusted 
computing platform.
A trustworthy CRTM reliably measures the integrity of the next piece of code following 
in the boot sequence. The result of this measurement is extended into the platform 
configuration register (PCR) in the TPM before the control is transferred to the next 
program in the sequence. If each component in the sequence in turn measures the next 
before handing off control, there’s a chain of trust established. If this measurement chain 
continues throughout the entire boot sequence, the resulting PCR values transitively 
reflect the measurement of all files used.
In the unlikely event that one of the components in the chain gets compromised, it is 
re-measured before its execution during the next reboot. Even if the control is transferred 
to the malicious software, and the malicious software attempts to fake the measurements, 
it will have to run a cryptographic gauntlet, where the fake measurements extended to 
PCR would equal the value it would have had after an uncompromised boot. Thus, the 
cryptographic strength of the SHA-1 hashing algorithm makes it computationally unlikely 
for the tampered code to calculate an extension value that would “adjust” the PCR values.
Now that we have expplained what RTM and RTS are, let’s look at the measured boot 
process, which is one of the two steps listed above that are used to assert the integrity of 
the pre-launch and launch components of a platform.
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Figure 3-1. Measured boot process
Measured Boot Process
A measured boot process, as shown in the Figure 3-1, is a boot sequence starting at a root 
of trust for measurement (RTM) initiating a series of measurements consisting of all the 
relevant trusted compute base (TCB) components into the root of trust for storage (RTS). 
The measured boot performs no evaluation or verification of any of the component’s 
identities.
There are two ways defined by the trusted compute group (TCG) to establish this 
trust during boot:
Static root of trust (S-RTM)•	
Dynamic root of trust (D-RTM)•	
Figure 3-2 depicts these two boot models and the associated trust chains. As the 
name Static Root of Trust for Measurement (S-RTM) suggests, the entire trust begins with 
the static, immutable piece of code, which is called the core root of trust for measurement 
(CRTM). On ordinary computing platforms, BIOS is the first component to be executed. 
Therefore, the trusted platform needs an additional entity to measure the BIOS and 
act as a CRTM. This entity is a fundamental trusted building block (TBB) that remains 
unchanged during the lifetime of the platform. The CRTM can be an integrated part of the 
BIOS itself (e.g., Microsoft Windows 8), like a BIOS boot block. The CRTM can also be a 
set of CPU instructions that are normally stored within a chip on the motherboard. This 
latter method can be more resistant to tampering, as exemplified by the Intel TXT.
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In the static root of trust method, all trust starts with a fixed or immutable piece 
of trusted code in the BIOS. This trusted piece of code measures the next piece of code 
to be executed and extends a platform configuration register (PCR) in the TPM based 
on the measurement before that control is transferred to the next program. If each new 
program in turn measures the next one before transferring control, there’s a chain of trust 
established. If this measurement chain continues through the entire boot sequence, the 
resultant PCR values will reflect the measurement of all files used. This “measurement 
before execution” model therefore leads to a chain of trust that’s observable by a remote 
party wanting to assess the trustworthiness of a system. Hence, S-RTM enables trust on 
the entire boot chain, including the master boot record, boot loader, kernel, drivers, and 
all files referenced or executed during boot. These are all parts of a trusted computing 
base (TCB). In other words, a TCB encompasses the sum of all the components that affect 
a system’s assurance.
However, S-RTM has two shortcomings:
•	 Scalability and Inclusivity. The number of components in a boot 
chain is large. Each component’s trusted computing base (TCB), 
and hence security, depends on the many layers of code that have 
been executed earlier in the chain. Windows and Linux have an 
ill-defined TCB and therefore they require all executable content 
to be measured, including executables, libraries, and shell scripts. 
Components determining the chain of trust (including TCB) 
are subject to frequent patching and updating with their myriad 
configuration variations. Also, the launch order of elements in the 
chain may vary, leading to different measurement values in PCRs. 
Keeping track of the expected values for integrity measurements 
becomes a nettlesome task.
Figure 3-2. S-RTM and D-RTM trusted chains
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•	 Uncontrolled Scope. The execution of an S-RTM sequence 
pulls in code for the evaluation of an OS TCB that’s unrelated 
to the operation of the platform. This forces mostly unnecesary 
evaluations of software and firmware, including BIOS 
components loaded and run during the boot process, only to be 
discarded just to verify the integrity of the TCB.
These shortcomings were identified by the TCG. The newer TCG 1.2 specifications 
define a new mechanism for an authenticated boot: dynamic root of trust for 
measurement, or D-RTM.
Dynamic root of trust for measurement (D-RTM) reduces the complexity of the 
TCB, making the evaluation of the platform state more tractable. With D-RTM, the 
trust properties of the components are ignored until a secure event, such as an enabled 
hypervisor launch, triggers and initializes the system, starting the initial root of trust 
measurement. Components that were staged before the D-RTM secure event are 
excluded from the TCB and not allowed to execute after the trust properties of the system 
are established. D-RTM is much more streamlined compared to S-RTM.
The server platforms used in virtualization and cloud data centers present 
challenging boot scenarios where D-RTM alone won't suffice. The TCB in a true D-RTM 
implementation will not include the system management modules (SMM), which are 
needed to support server RAS (reliability, availability, scalability) features. SMM is part 
of the pre-boot BIOS, and a pure D-RTM implementation excludes these items. Intel TXT 
provides a hybrid implementation of S-RTM and D-RTM, as described above, to establish 
trust during the boot process. The book Intel Trusted Execution Technology for Server 
Platforms from Apress has exhaustive coverage of S-RTM and D-RTM.
Attestation
The second step in ensuring boot integrity of a platform is to guarantee that the executed 
and launched components are trusted components. This process is called attestation, 
and without this step there is no assurance that the platform is in a trusted state. Why is 
attestation important from a cloud perspective? There are two main considerations for 
use cases to be instantiated and delivered in a cloud:
How would the entity needing this information know if a specific •	
platform is Intel TXT enabled, or if a specific server has a defined 
or compliant BIOS or VMM running on it (i.e., can it be trusted)?
Why should the entity requesting this information (which, in a •	
cloud environment, could be a resource scheduler or orchestrator 
trying to schedule a service on a set of available nodes or servers) 
trust the response from the platform?
An attestation service provides definitive answers to these questions. Chapter 4 
covers attestation in detail, including description of a reference attestation platform 
for Intel-based platforms, code-named Mt. Wilson. But here is a quick summary of the 
capability.
CHAPTER 3 ■ PlATfoRm BooT InTEgRITy: foundATIon foR TRusTEd ComPuTE Pools
43
Attestation ratchets up the notion of roots of trust by making the information from 
various roots of trust visible and usable by other entities. In a TPM-based implementation 
of RTS and RTR, it provides a digital signature of platform configuration registers (PCR), 
with a set of registers in a TPM extended with specific measurements for various launch 
modules of the software and the requestor validating the signature and the PCR contents. 
To validate, first the requestor invokes, via an agent on the host or device, the TPM_Quote 
command, specifying an attestation identity key to perform the digital signature on 
the set of PCRs to quote, and a cryptographic nonce to ensure freshness of the digital 
signature. Next, the attestation service validates the signature and determines the trust  
of the launched server by comparing the measurements from the TPM quote with 
known-good measurements. It is a critical IT operations challenge to manage the  
known-good measurement for hypervisors, operating systems, and BIOS software to ensure 
they are all protected from tampering and spoofing. This capability can be internal to a 
company, offered by a service provider, or delivered remotely as a service by a trusted 
third party (TTP). The process is described in detail in Chapter 4.
The measured boot and the attestation thus enable a server/host to demonstrate 
its boot integrity. Failure of a measured boot process or attestation can initiate a series 
of remediation steps that are managed and controlled by the policies in the data center. 
Barring any hardware or configuration issues, then, a failed attestation would mean one 
of following two conditions:
Someone or something has tampered with one or more launch •	
components.
A wrong version (compared to the known-good or whitelist) of •	
BIOS, OS, drivers, and so on has been installed and attempted to 
launch at the server/host.
Security tools like security information and event management (SIEMs), compliance 
tools, and configuration checkers would flag these alerts to drive the appropriate 
remediation actions. In short, having the ability to assert the integrity of a platform is both 
valuable and necessary. With a set of platforms that have demonstrated integrity, they can 
be aggregated to do interesting things. This aggregation of platforms is what we refer to as a 
trusted compute pool (TCP).
Trusted Compute Pools
The notion of a trusted compute pool (TCP) relies on the establishment and propagation 
of a new data center management attribute: platform trust. Platform trust derives 
directly from the boot integrity demonstrated by the server. TCP is a leading approach to 
aggregate trusted systems and to segregate them from untrusted resources, which results 
in a split between higher value, more sensitive workloads and commodity application 
workloads. The principles of TCP operation (see Figure 3-3) are to:
Create a cloud subsystem that meets the specific and varying •	
security requirements of users.
Control administrative access to subsystems so that the right •	
workloads get deployed and maintained there.
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Secure, federated, and multi-factored authentication of users and •	
devices accessing the services.
Continuous monitoring and, on detection of a change in host •	
trust or geolocation, generation of alerts and implementation of 
configured remediation measures.
Audits of that segment of the cloud that enables users to verify •	
compliance.
Figure 3-3. Trusted compute pools
These trusted pools allow IT to gain the benefits of the dynamic cloud environment 
while enforcing higher levels of protection for their more critical and security-sensitive 
workloads. The resources tagged green in Figure 3-3 are trusted, and the resources 
tagged red are untrusted, as they have not asserted their boot integrity. Critical policies 
can be defined such that security-sensitive cloud services can be launched only on these 
resources or migrated only to other trusted platforms within these pools. Also, use of 
TCPs eliminates the need for air-gapped (i.e., isolated from the rest of the data center) 
clusters of servers.
TCP Principles of Operation
How is a trusted compute pool created? Platform trust is the primary attribute used by 
management orchestration and operational software to create a trusted pool. Initially, 
platform trust is achieved through the use of a trusted platform launch (which, for 
server platforms, is based on TXT). Once this initial platform trust is established, TCP 
incorporates additional protections, including visibility of the integrity of the infrastructure 
and control of the placement and migration of workloads. Figure 3-4 shows a progression 
of TCP functionality with increasing levels of trust and compliance.
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Figure 3-4. Progression of trusted compute pool usage
When a trusted pool is created, systems and workloads can be tagged with specific 
security policies, enabling the monitoring, control, and audits for the placement and 
migration of workloads into, across, and outside the pool. The most obvious premise 
behind this is that highly confidential and sensitive applications and workloads must be 
constrained by policy to run only on systems that have proved to be trusted.
The rest of this section of the chapter describes the flows involved in supporting each 
of the use cases represented in Figure 3-5.
Figure 3-5. Core use cases for trusted compute pools
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Pool Creation
This is the first step in TCP, involving the creation of a group of platforms with a common 
level of trust. Pool creation involves the following steps:
 1. Virtualization management and orchestration software 
identifies and enumerates the platforms with demonstrated 
and attested platform boot integrity.
 2. Virtualization management software incorporates the 
platforms into a trusted pool.
Workload Placement
Once a trusted pool of platforms has been created, workloads can be selected to be 
placed on that pool based on their security requirements. A typical flow for workload 
placement would involve the following:
 1. A cloud subscriber requests the workload be placed in a 
trusted pool.
 2. Security management tools identify and tag workloads for 
classification according to certain security properties.
 3. Security management tools match platform trust to workload 
classification according to existing policies.
 4. Orchestrator and scheduler software determines the best 
server to place the workload within the trusted pool, pursuant 
to existing server selection and security policies. The 
scheduler requests an attestation of the integrity of the server 
before the workload is placed on the server, to reaffirm its 
boot integrity.
 5. A compliance record is created to register the launch of 
the workload in the trusted pool. This record is tied to the 
hardware root of trust of the server, and can be associated 
with a set of security controls to meet compliance 
requirements.
Workload Migration
Infrastructure as a service (IaaS) cloud multi-tenant environments typically use 
virtualization capability to migrate virtual machines across physical hosts. When it 
comes to security-sensitive workloads, it is desirable, or perhaps even essential, to meet 
customer requirements that these migrations occur only between prequalified trusted 
platforms. A flow representing how to achieve this goal in a TCP environment might 
occur as follows:
 1. A migration of workload is triggered either manually or based 
on resource orchestrator/scheduler policies.
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 2. The resource scheduler determines the set of servers that best 
meets the policy, based on the security standards associated 
with the workload. (The scheduler requests an attestation of 
the integrity of the target host.) The first server in the set that 
meets the integrity requirements is picked.
 3. The orchestration software migrates the workload to the new 
server.
 4. A compliance record is created to register the migration of 
the workload to this new location, including the attestation of 
integrity at the time of selection.
Compliance Reporting for a Workload/Cloud Service
Being able to prove to an auditing entity that the security requirements of a given 
workload have been fulfilled is just as important as actually fulfilling those requirements. 
A flow for compliance reporting might be as follows:
 1. The compliance tool enumerates all the virtual machines in 
the service or workload.
 2. The compliance tool evaluates the security controls for each 
virtual machine; these controls include determining the trail 
of hosts and the migration of records throughout the virtual 
machine lifecycle.
 3. A report is generated to provide proof that security properties 
associated with the workload running on TCP have been met. 
This verifiable proof is linked to the hardware root of trust 
(provided by TXT) in the participating hosts.
Solution Reference Architecture for the TCP
The Intel TXT-enabled launch is not sufficient to support the TCP uses mentioned in 
the previous section. Measurement and attestation tell the data center and security 
management software whether a given host can be trusted, but there is more to it than that. 
Exposing, transporting, storing, and ultimately consuming platform trust measurements 
in support of the use cases is an integration challenge across different software and 
management elements. Successfully doing this requires a well-defined and seamless 
integration model of multiple security management and data center/cloud management 
software components; in other words, there needs to be an underlying solution 
architecture.
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Figure 3-6 depicts a reference architecture for these trusted compute pool usages. It 
prescribes four distinct layers, with each layer serving one of the four functions:
 1. Reporting of the source of the platform trust/boot integrity 
measurements
 2. Interface with the boot integrity information via secure 
protocols
 3. Verifification/appraisal of the boot integrity measurements
 4. Consumer of the boot integrity verification for policy 
enforcement, compliance reporting, and remediation





























Figure 3-6. Solution architecture for the trusted compute pools
Here’s a brief overview of the four layers of this software architecture, starting from 
the base and moving upward.
Hardware Layer
At the base of the architecture we have the physical server hardware. For virtualization 
and the cloud computing environment, the hardware typically consists of x86 
architecture-based servers. These are servers hosting the virtualization and cloud 
workloads. Intel TXT enables trusted compute pool usages. (See sidebar for a brief 
introduction to the technology.) In addition to having TXT-enabled CPUs and chipsets, 
there needs to be Intel Virtualization Technology (VT) and a trusted platform module, 
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or TPM. TXT needs support in the BIOS, as well. By default, TXT and TPM are not 
enabled in the BIOS in the current generation of servers. Unfortunately, the method for 
turning on TXT and TPM support varies by vendor; there is no standard for carrying out 
this operation. There are, however, well-published documents on how to enable TXT 
and TPM for various OEM vendors, available from Intel and few security management 
companies supporting Intel TXT.
One of the challenges in scale deployments and enablement of TXT is meeting the 
need for physical access and the assertion of presence to enable the TPM and TXT 
on a server platform via the BIOS interface. This limits automation and large-scale 
enablement. Though each of the OEM provides custom implementation and interfaces 
for doing this, unless there are architectural solutions such as a physical presence 
interface (PPI), the provisioning and configuration task won’t become any simpler.
Operating System / Hypervisor Layer
Moving up the stack, the second layer is the OS/hypervisor. To participate in a measured 
launch, an OS or hypervisor has to be enabled for TXT. The changes related to TXT are 
in the initialization code, and also during termination and shutdown. Additionally, 
basic enablement means that the operating system or hypervisor can invoke the 
secure launch process. This entails including a pre-kernel module that can ensure the 
right SINIT (authenticated code modules from Intel) module is selected and assure the 
orderly evaluation of the launch components of the software. Intel provides a reference 
implementation called Trusted Boot (tboot) for the pre-kernel module that can be 
integrated into OS/hypervisors toward enabling for Intel TXT, and it is the maintainer of 
this open-source “tboot” project.
Tboot is by far the most widely used mechanism offered by software vendors 
to enable their OS or hypervisor. SINIT modules on server platforms are generally 
embedded in the platform BIOS, and are processor- and chipset generation-specific. 
The tboot components provided by Intel are integrated into the operating systems or 
hypervisors (by the respective ISVs) and work across multiple generations of platforms. 
This makes sense, as it allows the most qualified party (in this case, the ISV) to determine 
which modules are essential for the trusted compute base (TCB) of their software, and 
therefore which modules to include in the measured launch and in which order.
Tboot technology is included in multiple open-source operating system/hypervisor 
environments from Linux, to Xen/KVM, to a number of commercial products, such as 
Red Hat and Citrix XenServer. Other vendors, like VMware, have implemented their own 
tboot-like functions. It is interesting to note that the percentage of TCB measured by 
vendors as part of the launch process varies significantly. As of this writing, VMware by far 
has the most coverage of the TCB. Other OS/VMM vendors have the core kernel and few 
modules measured. All of these vendors have been actively working toward increasing 
the amount of TCB that they measure. For detailed coverage of the measured launch 
environments (MLE) developer guidance, check out the book Intel Trusted Execution 
Technology for Server Platforms from Apress.
With TXT and TPM correctly configured and enabled in hardware, when a  
TXT-enabled OS/hypervisor is launched, the platform goes through a measured D-RTM 
launch. Just to refresh your understanding of the TXT launch process, when a TXT launch 
happens, what you have is a measured launch of the firmware, BIOS, and controlling 
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software like an OS or VMM. These measurements (which are the identities of the 
various components), as part of the launch process are stored in the various registers in 
the TPM (RTS and RTR) called PCRs (platform configuration registers) and are verified 
with an attestation system. TCG PC Spec provides the semantics for where the various 
measurements are stored in the TPM.
Virtualization/Cloud Management and  
Verification/Attestation Layer
This is the critical management and orchestration layer in a data center that controls 
the provisioning, deployment, and lifecycle management of the workloads and virtual 
machines. This layer serves one of four functions for the trusted compute pool use cases:
 1. Provides a secure interface to the measured launch 
measurements on each of the servers
 2. Provides an attestation mechanism to evaluate platform trust 
and assert its integrity
 3. Consumes the trust information, essentially helping to 
identify which platforms are trusted and which ones are not
 4. Makes use of this information to establish an enhanced 
security capability through policy definition and enforcement 
linked to platform trust
There are significant differences in terms of interfaces provided to support platform 
trust. Some, such as Citrix, have developed explicit APIs natively to their hypervisor 
software (Xen APIs) to provide TCG-compliant access to the launch measurements in 
the TPM. These APIs are available for any management software to use—for evaluation, 
attestation, reporting, alerting, and so on—and they maintain the integrity of the 
measurements. Others, such as VMWare, have tied access to these measurements to their 
primary virtualization resource management software—vCenter, in this case. VMware 
provides access to the measurements via run-time vCenter APIs, which when invoked 
instantiate a TCG-compliant remote attestation protocol to request the measurements 
for the attesting server/device. None of the virtualization and cloud management 
software vendors provides verification/attestation software for verification of the 
measurements. Since attestation is a relatively new concept, it is not yet integral to most 
of the virtualization and cloud management software. Having attestation services provided 
through the operating system or hypervisor would establish the function across many 
enterprise and cloud customers—thereby unlocking the most valuable use models.
Intel in collaboration with security ISVs have developed attestation software 
for attestation verification. This attestation software is a multi-hypervisor, multi-OS 
verification/attestation program providing a secure assertion of the hypervisor and 
platform integrity that is verified against a set of known-good, golden measurements, 
or whitelist values. Following the key tenet of cloud technology with regard to 
programmability and automation, the attestation platform exposes all its functionality via 
well-defined REST & SOAP APIs for querying trust assertions, as well as for provisioning, 
CHAPTER 3 ■ PlATfoRm BooT InTEgRITy: foundATIon foR TRusTEd ComPuTE Pools
51
management, and whitelisting. The attestation process and the Intel attestation platform 
are covered in detail in Chapter 4. The trust assertion from the attestation/verification 
software is used by the cloud management software and the security management tools 
that are in the next layer of the architecture.
Security Management Layer
The security management layer is the top layer, where the platform trust assertion 
from the previous layer is requested and consumed. This security applications layer 
includes some classes of traditional security applications focused on event reporting and 
managing compliance and risk. Because the technologies and trusted compute pools 
involve platform integrity and trust, workload control, and policy enforcement, it makes 
perfect sense to have such applications aware of and enabled to detect, report, and act on 
the trust information available from the Intel TXT–enabled platforms.




These tools are critical for mainstreaming trust and elements of cloud security into 
any overall corporate security management systems. This is a crucial requirement, as 
IT managers do not want a new suite of tools for managing cloud security; they would 
very much rather see existing tools extended to include the new cloud and virtualized 
architectures as they adopt them. The primary motivation for these security management 
tools is to ensure that they have the visibility to platform trust and a set of control 
functions to management the lifecycle of the VMs/workloads. Though initially the 
monitoring and enforcement of trust might be periodic, over time we envision that these 
tools will provide continuous monitoring and enforcement of policies based on trust.
VM/Workload Policy Management
These tools provide the mechanism to specify and define the granular security 
requirements for the virtual machines and workloads, and to enforce these requirements 
during the lifetime of those virtual machines. Defining a security policy for a workload 
runs the gamut from the trivial, such as asserting “I want to run on trusted servers,” to 
the sophisticated. For an example of the latter, a policy definition could include “Run on 
servers with trust level X and only on servers that are in geolocation Y, and don’t co-exist 
with Z type of workloads.” Today, there is no canon for policy definition, nor standards 
for tagging the workloads. Each of the policy management ISVs carries a particular 
language of definition and execution environments, with these definitions likely not to be 
portable or interoperable with other vendor offerings. As these capabilities mature, it is 
imperative that policy definitions and other matters of semantics become standardized 
and interoperable across vendors.
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Policy tools also provide an interface to feed the following information to other 
security management tools in this layer of the stack, like the security event management 
and GRC tools. They provide:
Auditable information about the policies that have been •	
evaluated
Evidence considered during policy evaluation•	
Whitelists/manifests/known-good measurements considered for •	
decision making
Reports of decisions made, such as launch or deny workload •	
creation or migration in a certain pool of compute servers
This information is provided in different formats while preserving integrity and 
maintaining the chain of trust. Hytrust VPA and McAfee ePO are examples of policy 
management tools for trusted compute pools.
GRC Tools—Compliance in the Cloud
GRC tools set requirements for platform trust and integrity based on workload 
requirements and security standards, followed by an assessment of the environment to 
determine security controls in place and to dashboard actual conditions against policy 
to determine compliance. SIEM tools allow trust events to be captured, reported, logged, 
and processed for correlation to determined responses or heuristics to indicate whether 
a larger attack is occurring. Although not every organization will need the high level of 
security afforded by a trusted computing environment, every organization using cloud 
services will benefit from the vastly improved control and transparency that a measured 
chain of trust enables.
Simply being able to verify conditions in the cloud services, down the stack through 
the hypervisor, brings significant value to users with its visibility into actual states and 
activities within the cloud and in its improved governance for cloud resources. Internal 
and private clouds built on a measured chain of trust will:
Strengthen an organization’s ability to enforce differentiated •	
policies in private clouds
Enhance monitoring for compliance at all layers within the cloud•	
Streamline the auditing process•	
Allow for more flexible usage and billing for secure computing •	
resources
Organizations often see the completion of a regulatory audit as the end goal of their 
compliance efforts. The reality is that compliance is a continuous cycle that starts with 
technical and operational decisions on how to address control requirements. It's an 
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Figure 3-7. GRC dashboard showing compliance to platform trust
accomplishment to have auditors give a thumbs-up to your technical and administrative 
controls. That goal notwithstanding, passing subsequent audits requires continuous 
maintenance and reporting on those controls. Cloud teams hold the key to making that 
happen in a scalable, automated manner. The most effective approach to achieving 
continuous compliance is to define and implement policies, guidelines, standards, 
and tools that secure the organization’s computing systems as a whole, with an eye 
toward regulatory guidance, standards, and mandates themselves. Ensuring that 
the corresponding security controls meet or exceed the standards prescribed by the 
governing body will help ensure a successful audit.
RSA was one of the first ecosystem participants to demonstrate the value of platform 
trust for GRC uses, with a joint Intel–VMware-RSA demonstration at the RSA Security 
Show in 2010. Figure 3-7 shows a dashboard view of the status of a security control tied 
to platform trust. Intel is working with a number of other providers in these market 
segments to provide customers with ample choice of solutions and capabilities.
Now that we have laid out the details of the solution architecture for trusted compute 
pools, let's focus on a specific example and walk through one solution stack with a 
reference implementation of the use cases, so as to put these new concepts on a solid 
footing.
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Reference Implementation: The Taiwan Stock 
Exchange Case Study
The Taiwan Exchange Stock Exchange Corporation (TWSE) is a stock exchange in 
Taiwan that supports the trading of 758 listed companies. Its primary business drivers are 
developing new financial products and boosting the number of services it offers. Cloud 
computing will be part of its ability to do so, but it realizes that strong security controls 
must first be part of the picture.
A fundamental business and technical requirement for the cloud infrastructure under 
construction at the TWSE infrastructure is to provide secure systems and trusted compute 
environments. It has established as crucial the ability to integrate software application 
solutions that provide TWSE with overall trust and security for its cloud infrastructure and 
that exploit hardware-based security and include roots of trust and platform attestation. 
The goals for the proof of concept built for this case study were to enable:
Greater visibility into the security states of the hardware platforms •	
running the infrastructure as a service (IaaS) for their private clouds.
Production of automated, standardized reports on the •	
configuration of the physical and virtual infrastructure hosting 
customer virtual machines and data.
Controls based on the physical location of the server’s virtual •	
machines and control any migration of these virtual machines 
onto acceptable servers per policy specified.
Generation of measured evidence that their services •	
infrastructure complies with security policies and with regulated 
data standards.
To explore the capabilities and challenges of implementing such an infrastructure, 
TWSE engaged Intel and other key ecosystem partners to develop a multi-phased proof of 
concept (PoC) implementation of a more secure cloud based on familiar tools, platforms, 
and software. The basic capabilities under the proof of concept include:
Measured boot for servers, with platform attestation•	
Ability to create trusted compute pools•	
Security-controlled workload placement in the trusted compute •	
pools
Security controlled workload migration into trusted compute •	
pools
Integration and extension of security and platform trust with •	
McAfee ePolicy Orchestrator* (McAfee ePO)
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Solution Architecture for TWSE
For the proof of concept, a number of systems and solutions were selected based on 
TWSE’s current and future business directions and needs. They map directly onto the 
solution reference architecture layers discussed in the earlier section. As shown in 
Figure 3-8, these include:
•	 Cloud system and infrastructure supported by Cisco. This includes 
a Cisco UCS server with Intel Xeon processor E5 family and Intel 
TXT-enabled, equipped with the optional Cisco TPM part. Three 
blades were used to establish a mix of trusted and untrusted 
platforms in the PoC environment.
•	 Virtualization solutions supported by VMware. VMware ESXi 5.1  
provides fullly integrated support for Intel TXT and enables 
remote platform attestation measurements to detect possible 
malicious changes to BIOS and other critical base-software 
components of the servers. VMware ESXi 5.1, in conjunction 
with TXT, measures the critical components of the hypervisor 
stack when the system boots and it stores these measurements 
in the platform configuration registers (PCR) of the TPM on the 
platform.
•	 Trust and policy management supported by HyTrust and HyTrust 
Appliance. HyTrust Appliance 3.5 provides extensive support 
for Intel TXT; the HyTrust Appliance verifies the integrity of 
the physical hardware of the host to ensure that the underlying 
platform is fully trusted and can implement policies based on this 
information. It can ensure that specified workloads are permitted 
to be instantiated only on specific hosts or clusters, the essence 
of TCP. It also intercepts all administrative access and change 
requests, determines whether a request is in accordance with the 
organization’s defined policy, and permits or denies the request 
as appropriate. The HyTrust Appliance is not a physical piece of 
hardware; it is a VMware vSphere*compatible virtual appliance 
deployed alongside the rest of the virtual infrastructure. Finally, 
it provides direct sharing of trust and security information with 
McAfee ePolicy Orchestrator (McAfee ePO).
•	 Security management solution supported by McAfee. McAfee 
ePO unifies security management through an open platform, 
simplifies risk and compliance management, and provides 
security intelligence across endpoints, networks, data, and 
compliance solutions. It helps to manage security, streamline and 
automate compliance processes, and increase overall visibility 
across security management activities. McAfee with HyTrust ePO 
extensions enable communication with the HyTrust Appliance.
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Figure 3-8. TWSE proof of concept solution components
Trusted Compute Pool Use Case Instantiation
Although all of the Cisco blades in this PoC were fully Intel TXT-capable, it was important 
to have a contrast between trusted and untrusted servers so as to differentiate trusted 
pools and prove the controls and status reporting mechanisms. For this reason, Intel 
TXT was disabled in the system BIOS configuration settings in one of the Cisco UCS 
blades to prohibit the system from executing a trusted launch. HyTrust Appliance 
had full integration of remote attestation capabilities. From VMWare ESXi side, the 
measured elements included the VMkernel, kernel modules, drivers, native management 
applications that run on ESXi, and any boot-time configuration options. As shown in 
Figure 3-9, the trust status dashboard of the HyTrust Appliance shows an unknown BIOS 
trust status, unknown VMM status, and overall unknown status for the second Cisco UCS 
blade as a consequence of disabling the Intel TXT support.
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Remote Attestation with HyTrust
The HyTrust Appliance provides extensive support for Intel TXT, plus policy control 
functionality for this use case—essentially establishing the parameters and policies 
for a trusted compute pool. As shown in Figure 3-10, the HyTrust Appliance provides 
management of critical platform attestation functionality, whitelisting of known-good 
measurements, and trust operation and report dashboards for trusted compute pools, 
as well as a broad set of other virtualization security controls for workloads, servers, and 
administrators. The HyTrust Appliance and these solutions were used to detect, measure, 
and report the trust of both the server platforms and the hypervisor, and to implement 
workload controls (VM migration, etc.) based on the required platform trust attributes.
Figure 3-9. HyTrust trust attestation service dashboard indicating two trusted hosts and 
one untrusted host
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To summarize, the remote attestation process provides an independent evaluation 
of the integrity measurements of the firmware, BIOS, and the VMM against known-
good (whitelist) program components, and it securely makes that assertion available to 
the HyTrust Appliance policy enforcement and reporting components. The evaluation 
of the measurements is comprehensive and covers the core of the BIOS, the BIOS 
configurations, the VMM kernel, and various VMM modules loaded as part of the 
VMware ESXi launch. Figure 3-11 shows a snapshot of the actual measurements of an 
ESXi Server with the known-good or whitelist values.
Figure 3-10. HyTrust Appliance with remote trust attestation architecture
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Use Case Example: Creating Trusted Compute Pools 
and Workload Migration
Knowing the trust status of both the servers and the hypervisor highlighted the platform 
trust information to TWSE, as well as defined an appropriate set of operational policies 
and controls. The reference implementation demonstrated the operational details of the 
trusted compute pools use cases as follows:
Creation of trusted compute pools•	
Workload placement in the trusted compute pools•	
Workload migration into the trusted compute pools•	
Dashboard reporting with McAfee ePolicy Orchestrator*  •	
(McAfee ePO*)
The HyTrust Appliance enabled the team to intercept all administrative requests for 
the virtual infrastructure, determine whether the request was in accordance with defined 
policy, permit or deny that request, and record all administrative access and change 
requests.
To apply effective end-to-end trust policies for the cloud infrastructure, the team did 
the following:
Created trusted compute pools with Intel TXT•	
Identified and labeled the sensitive workloads that required •	
protection
Configured the trust policies to establish trust requirements•	
Figure 3-11. Trust attestation service - trust report view
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Assigned and managed workload migration based on defined •	
trust polices
Enforced trust policies end-to-end•	
Recorded all activities, including audit, and compliance; and •	
provided reports
Integrated and Extended Security and Platform Trust 
with McAfee ePO
A TWSE requirement was the integration and reporting of all security events and 
enforcement decisions to a SIEM and GRC system. This gave TWSE another common 
and aggregated management view of its cloud infrastructure. The PoC used the HyTrust 
Appliance to extend and integrate the trust information for each hypervisor and the 
virtualized resource functionality to the McAfee ePO console.
The direct integration of the HyTrust Appliance dashboard showed users the Intel 
TXT trust status of the host on which each VM was running. HyTrust Appliance assessed 
compliance by comparing a host’s current configuration with a hardening configuration 
template that was customized based on TWSE requirements. It then provided assessment 
data to the master ePO dashboard for reporting and analysis. HyTrust Appliance gave 
McAfee ePO a record of all administrative activities, including a unique user ID, and 
operations attempted by the privileged user, including denied or failed attempts.  
Figure 3-12 shows the aggregated view of trust within the McAfee ePO dashboard.
Figure 3-12. McAfee ePO displaying administrator activity and trust status captured by 
HyTrust Appliance
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Figure 3-13 shows a drilldown view of the trust information in the McAfee ePO 
system as provided by the seamless integration between the HyTrust Appliance and the 
McAfee policy orchestrator.
Figure 3-13. McAfee ePO displaying a drilldown of the server trust status from the HyTrust 
Appliance
McAfee ePO’s flexible automation capability streamlined the workflows, dramatically 
reducing the cost and complexity of security and compliance administration.
INteL tXt arChIteCtUraL OVerVIeW
Intel TXT is a set of enhanced hardware components designed to protect sensitive 
information from software-based attacks. Intel TXT features include capabilities in 
the microprocessor, chipset, I/o subsystems, and other platform components. When 
coupled with an enabled operating system, hypervisor, and enabled applications, 
these capabilities provide confidentiality and integrity of data in a time of 
increasingly hostile environments.
Intel TXT incorporates a number of secure processing innovations (see figure 3-14), 
including:
•	 Protected execution. lets applications run in isolated environments 
so that no unauthorized software on the platform can observe or 
tamper with the operational information. Each of these isolated 
environments executes with the use of dedicated resources 
managed by the platform.
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•	 Sealed storage. Provides the ability to encrypt and store keys, data, 
and other sensitive information within the hardware. This can be 
decrypted only by the same environment as encrypted it.
•	 Attestation. Enables a system to provide assurance that the 
protected environment has been correctly invoked and takes a 
measurement of the software running in the protected space.  
The information exchanged during this process is known as the 
attestation identity key credential, and is used to establish mutual 
trust between parties.
•	 Protected launch. Provides the controlled launch and registration 
of critical system software components in a protected execution 
environment.
•	 Trusted extensions integrated into silicon (processor and chipset). 
Allow for the orderly quiescence of all activities on the platform 
such that a tamper-resistant environment is enabled for the 
measurement and verification processes; and allows for protection 
of platform secrets in the case of “reset” and other disruptive 
attacks.
•	 Authenticated code modules (ACm). Authenticate platform-specific 
code to the chipset and execute in an isolated environment within 
the processor and the trusted environment (authenticated code 
mode) enabled by AC modules to perform secure tasks.
Figure 3-14. Intel Trusted Execution Technology components
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Intel TXT Principles of Operation
Intel TXT works through the creation of a measured launch environment (mlE) 
enabling an accurate comparison of all the critical elements of the launch environment 
against a known-good source. Intel TXT creates a cryptographically unique identifier 
for each approved launch-enabled component and then provides a hardware-based 
enforcement mechanism to block the launch of the code that does not match that 
which is authenticated or, alternatively, indicates when an expected trusted launch 
has not happened. This hardware-based solution provides the foundation on which 
IT administrators can build trusted platform solutions to protect against aggressive 
software-based attacks and to better control their virtualized or cloud environments.
figure 3-15 illustrates two different scenarios. In the first, the measurements match 
the expected values, so the launch of the BIos, firmware, and Vmm are allowed. In 
the second, the system has been compromised by a rootkit hypervisor, which has 
attempted to install itself below the hypervisor to gain access to the platform. In this 
case, the Intel TXT-enabled, mlE-calculated hash system measurements differ from 
the expected value, owing to the insertion of the rootkit. Therefore, the measured 
environment will not match the expected value and, based on the launch policy, Intel 
TXT could abort the launch of the hypervisor or report an untrusted launch into the 
virtualization or cloud management infrastructure for subsequent use.
Figure 3-15. How Intel Trusted Execution Technology protects the launch environment
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Summary
In this chapter, we introduced the concept of platform boot integrity and trust. We 
covered the roots of trust in a trusted compute platform, and the two measured boot 
models, S-RTM and D-RTM. We introduced the concept of attestation as a critical 
requirement to assert the boot integrity, and presented the notion of trusted compute 
pools, including the use cases and the solution reference architecture for enabling 
trusted compute pools. By reviewing one solution stack and a reference implementation, 
we reinforced the concept and showed how to enable and use trusted compute 
pools. Platform trust is the new data center management attribute that can be used to 
orchestrate and manage the resources of virtualization and cloud data centers so as to 
meet the corresponding security challenges and requirements.
Looking ahead, Chapter 4 is a deep dive into attestation and view of a commercial 
implementation of a remote attestation software solution. In addition to platform trust 
and hardware roots of trust, more and more organizations and service providers are 
interested in providing visibility of and control to the physical location of the servers 
where the workloads and data are actually residing and executing. These controls are 
critical for federal agencies and regulated industries. Chapter 5 will introduce a new 
concept and control called hardware-assisted asset tag, which can be used to provide 
isolation, segregation, placement, and migration control of workload execution in multi-
tenant cloud environments. Additionally, as a specialization of asset tags, geolocation/
geotagging can be enabled to definitively provide visibility of the physical geolocation of 
the server, which can enable many controls that requirement hardware-based roots of 
trust to assert the location of the workloads and data. These attributes and the associated 
controls are dependent on the assertion of the boot integrity of the platform, and hence 
they become a great adjacency to trusted compute pools and boot integrity.
